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The Abolition of Domestic Rates (Etc) Scotland Act received Royal 
Assent on May 15th 1987. Any lingering doubts about its eventual 
implementation appear to have been dispelled by the Conservative victory 
in the UK General Election on June 11th although there is press 
speculation that the Scottish implementation date of April 1989 may be 
delayed to coincide with the introduction of similar legislation for England 
and Wales, which was announced in the Queen's Speech on June 25th 1987. 
Any such delay would be viewed as a response to the apparent unpopularity 
of the community charge or poll tax and to the scale of Conservative defeat 
in Scotland on June 11th. 
The Act is based on the Green Paper "Paying for Local Government" 
in which the reform proposals - the abolition of domestic rates, the 
introduction of the community charge, and the centralisation of non-
domestic rates - are described as "the most radical re-structuring of local 
government finance this century"(!) - a verdict with which few would 
disagree. 
This chapter will locate the reform proposals in their historical context 
by examining broad trends in the development of local government 
finance, with particular reference to the conflicts and tension between 
central and local government which have developed since the mid-1970's 
and to the impact of revaluation in 1985. The proposals will be examined to 
see how far they are consistent with Conservative fiscal and local 
government policies as they have developed since 1979. Attention will be 
paid to the nature and effectiveness of the opposition campaign inside and 
outside Parliament and the impact of the proposals on the future of Scottish 
local government will be discussed. 
Historical Background - The Road to the Poll Tax 
Local government in 19th century Scotland lacked uniformity and 
effectiveness until a series of Acts of Parliament in the late 1880s and 1890s, 
culminating in the 1900 Town Council (Scotland) Act which established a 
framework giving elected local authorities the powers to tackle major issues 
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such as sanitary and housing reform. The development of municipal 
services, with Glasgow in the forefront, proceeded throughout the 19th 
century, but it is from the 1890s that a recognisable and uniform local 
government system can be traced. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, 
local government has been financed by central government grants and rates 
-a local property tax. Rates have come under periodic attack and criticism 
but have survived, probably because of the attributes most clearly stated in 
the Report of the Layfield Committee which was set up in 1974 to review 
the whole system of local government finance in England, Scotland and 
Wales. 
"(i) a tax on property is particularly suitable as a local tax. There is no 
difficulty in attributing the yield to even the smallest units of local 
government, since this yield depends on the physical location of 
immovable property; 
(ii) the form of tax is relatively simple and understandable, however 
much less easy it may be to comprehend the underlying details; 
(iii) over many years there has been considerable stability in the 
operation of rating, with relatively small changes from year to 
year; 
(iv) property is visible and easily identifiable; it cannot be shifted 
geographically in response to change in rates of tax; 
(v) the yield of the tax is readily predictable and certain; 
(vi) evasion is extremely difficult; 
(vii) the cost of maintaining rating is not high in proportion to the yield; 
(viii) rates are a perceptible tax; the demand, expressed as a lump sum 
at yearly or half-yearly intervals, brings the tax prominently to the 
notice of ratepayers; 
(ix) because rates are perceptible, and because deliberate decisions 
have to be taken to raise rate poundages to meet increased costs, 
the tax promotes accountability; 
( x) there are no problems of confidentiality of the taxpayers' personal 
income or circumstances (save now, when rebates are 
claimed). "(2) 
As a result of central government policy and rising expectations, local 
government current expenditure in Scotland grew steadily in the 1960s and 
into the 1970s at an average annual rate of around 4% more than the rate of 
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inflation. (J) Expenditure doubled in real terms between 1964 and 1975. This 
growth in expenditure was encouraged by central government and matched 
by growth in rate support grant (RSG) which peaked at 75% of local 
government spending in 1975/76. 
1975 proved to be a turning point with the announcement by Tony 
Crosland, then Secretary of State for the Environment, that "the party's 
over" signalling the end of local government expansion financed largely by 
central government grants. 1975 was also the year of local government 
reorganisation in Scotland. As a result of significant inflation in the 
economy and the reorganisation, rate bills in Scotland rose by 28% 
provoking complaints from ratepayers and contributing to the terms of 
reference for the Layfield Committee. 
In considering the nature of the crisis, Layfield concluded that short-
term problems - "the virtual cessation in the rise of real national 
income ... the rapid increase in inflation and ... the reorganisation of local 
government"<4l - had highlighted longer-term fundamental problems 
concerning the financial and political relationship between central and local 
government. 
Having criticised the ambiguity which, in his Committee's view 
characterised this relationship, Layfield went on to produce proposals 
which themselves contained significant elements of ambiguity and 
contradiction and were, at the end of the day, unacceptable to both central 
and local government. 
The Committee took the view that "the only way to sustain a vital local 
democracy is to enlarge the share of local taxation in total local revenue and 
thereby make councillors more directly accountable to local electorates for 
their expenditure and taxation decisions". (Sl To realise this objective, they 
proposed the introduction of a local income tax (LIT) to supplement the 
rating system. The rating system would be retained and extended to 
agricultural land and buildings. LIT would be an additional source of 
revenue for "top tier" authorities - in the case of Scotland, the regional 
councils. Both regions and districts would continue to levy rates. This 
formula would allow central government grant to be reduced to around 
40% of local government expenditure thus enhancing local democracy and 
local accountability. 
However, and in apparent contradiction to the emphasis on local 
democracy and accountability, Layfield also asserted central government's 
right to control levels of local government expenditure in the interests of 
macroeconomic policy. 
Layfield's proposals found little favour with either central or local 
government but they set the scene for the debates of the 1980s and provided 
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ammunition both for the supporters of the rating system and the advocates 
of LIT. 
Aggregate Exchequer Grant as a percentage of local government 
spending in Scotland fell from 75% in 1975/76 to 68.5% in 1978/79. 
Expenditure reductions and rates increases became the order of the day but 
the effect of the pay restrictions embodied in the Social Contract kept the 
level of expenditure (and rates increases) down because of the labour 
intensive nature of local authority services. 
Prior to 1979, RSG reductions had been a pragmatic response to 
external economic pressures. Following the election of the Conservative 
government in 1979, the curtailment of local authority spending was 
elevated to a policy objective in its own right. This policy objective has been 
pursued through reductions in central government grant on the one hand 
(expressed as a percentage of Scottish local government expenditure, RSG 
was cut from 68.5% in 1980/81 to 56.1% in 1986/87) and the enactment of 
legislation which gave the Secretary of State for Scotland widespread 
powers to restrict local government spending. 
This radical and ideological approach swiftly turned local government 
into one of the main political battlefields of the Thatcher years. The 
emergence from the mid 1970s, of a new breed of Labour councillor, 
committed to a radical examination and extension of local government 
services, fuelled the conflict. The other major opponents of the 
government's economic and social policies, most notably the trade unions, 
experienced a series of crushing defeats in the 1980s. This trend reinforced 
the view of many on the political left that local government was the main 
agency for opposing central government policies and defending living 
standards while for those on the right, Labour local government came to be 
viewed as a major obstacle to the implementation of Conservative 
economic and social policies. 
The 1979 Conservative manifesto contained a commitment to re-open 
the debate on the rating system. The result was the 1981 Green Paper 
"Alternatives to Domestic Rates" which canvassed alternatives to the 
rating system, including a poll tax. This was followed by a White Paper, 
produced in 1983, which came to the following conclusion: 
"The Government were fully prepared to propose to Parliament the 
abolition of domestic rates if consultation had revealed broad-based 
support for an alternative system of local taxation which satisfied the 
criteria. However, it was clear from the response to the Green Paper 
and from the evidence given to the Environment Committee that no 
consensus can be found for an alternative tax to replace domestic 
rates. The Government recognises that rates are far from being an 
ideal or popular tax. But they do have advantages. They are highly 
49 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1988 
perceptible to ratepayers and they promote accountability. They are 
well understood, cheap to collect and very difficult to evade. They act 
as an incentive to the most efficient use of property. No property tax 
can be directly related to the ability to pay; the rate rebates, now 
incorporated in housing benefit, together with Supplementary 
Benefit, have been designed to reduce hardship. The Government 
have concluded and announced to Parliament that rates would 
remain for the foreseeable future the main source of local revenue for 
local government. "(6) 
Average rates increases in Scotland of 30% in 1980/81 and 34% in 
1981182 fuelled the anger expressed by ratepayers' groups and sections of 
the business community, but rates reform did not emerge as a serious issue 
in the 1983 election campaign and the poll tax did not even merit a mention. 
Following the 1983 election, the government pressed ahead with its 
legislative, financial and ideological attack on local government, but there 
appeared to be a consensus that there was no realistic alternative to the 
rating system. That consensus was shattered by the 1985 rating revaluation 
in Scotland. 
Revaluation - Instant Crisis 
Revaluations of property for rating purposes have been carried out in 
Scotland in 1971, 1978 and 1985. 
The 1975 Local Government (Scotland) Act prescribes quinquennial 
revaluations, but the Secretary of State used his powers to delay the full 
revaluation of the 1978 Valuation Roll from 1983 to 1985. Revaluation 
redistributes the rating burden between sectors of ratepayers and between 
individual households. Significantly, there has been no revaluation in 
England and Wales since 1973. 
The 1985 revaluation entailed a significant shift of the rating burden 
from industrial to domestic ratepayers and what the Green Paper "Paying 
for Local Government" described as "arbitrary and unpredictable 
impositions"(?) on many Scottish households. In spite of government 
measures to mitigate the effect of revaluation, including a special rebate 
scheme, over 100,000 households had an increase of more than 33% in their 
rate bills between 1984/85 and 1985/86. There were also significant 
fluctuations in the commercial and industrial sector. 
Not surprisingly, revaluation provoked an outraged response from a 
range of domestic and non-domestic ratepayers, many of whom were 
traditional Conservative supporters. If revaluation after 7 years had this 
effect in Scotland, it didn't take a great deal of imagination to work out 
what the consequences would be in England and Wales where there had 
50 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1988 
been no revaluation for 12 years. The hunt for alternatives to the rates now 
began in earnest with the publication of the Green Paper "Paying for Local 
Government" at the end of January 1986. Any lingering doubts amongst 
Conservatives about the unpopularity of revaluation were dispelled at the 
Regional Council elections in May 1986, when the Conservatives lost 
control of Tayside and Grampian Regions and suffered serious reverses 
elsewhere, notably in Lothian. Conservative councillors attributed much of 
their unpopularity to rating revaluation and saw the community charge and 
the abolition of rates as their electoral saviour. 
The Main Themes of the Act 
The 1987 Act has four main features: 
(i) the abolition of domestic rates; 
(ii) the introduction of a system of community charges; 
(iii) the transfer of control over the level of non-domestic rates from 
local authorities to the Secretary of State for Scotland; 
(iv) the replacement of rate support grant by revenue support grant. 
These reforms are to be implemented in April 1989. When similar 
legislation has been enacted for England and Wales, it is proposed to· 
introduce a Uniform Business Rate (UBR) for Scotland, England and 
Wales. 
The Case for Reform 
The case for the proposed reforms has two main planks. On the one 
hand, there are the principled arguments and criticisms of the existing 
rating systems contained in the Green Paper. On the other hand, there is 
the hidden agenda -the desire to control the high profile "big spending" 
authorities, to undermine support for local government in Scotland 
dominated as it is by the Labour Party and to secure or shore up traditional 
Conservative support which, it was believed, had been lost by revaluation 
in particular and the government's alleged failure to protect "the 
ratepayers" from rate increases substantially above the rate of inflation in 
general. 
These two strands often overlap and interact. Their co-existence goes a 
long way to explaining the theoretical poverty and inconsistencies of the 
Green Paper, which have been widely noted by most academic 
commentators. Its 133 pages have all the appearance of a document for 
which the conclusions were written first and the analysis to justify the 
conclusions produced as an afterthought. The contrast with, say, the style 
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and methodology of the Layfield Report produced 10 years earlier is 
striking and speaks volumes about the changing style of government over 
the decade - there is now a failure to seriously examine alternative 
arguments or evidence which does not sit neatly with the predetermined 
conclusions. The comments of Martlew and Bailey that the Green Paper's 
examination of the evidence is "narrow and partial in focus"(8) or of 
Midwinter and Mair that its proposals "mark the triumph of ideology over 
analysis"(9) are not untypical. 
Before examining the Green Paper's arguments and conclusions, a 
further criticism of its content and methodology must be made. The Green 
Paper's origins lie, to an extent, in developments in Scotland, particularly 
revaluation. Its conclusions for Scotland are similar to those for England 
and Wales, but there are significant diferences and they are to be 
implemented earlier and in a different way from the reforms in England and 
Wales. However, there is no integrated, sustained or convincing 
presentation of the Scottish evidence. 







England and Wales 







Of the seven Scottish tables, six contain background information on the 
characteristics of households and tax units, the population of communal 
establishments and comparative yields of national and local taxes. The 
seventh details the sources of funding of Scottish local government in 1985/ 
86. There is no serious attempt to evidence the consequences of the 
proposals for domestic and non-domestic ratepayers, and local authorities 
in Scotland. For a Scottish reader, promised specific Scottish legislation, 
reading the Green Paper is a frustrating experience. Irrespective of any 
other political arguments, it is difficult to imagine such a flawed Green 
Paper being produced had it been subject to examination by the 
committees of a Scottish Assembly. 
The case for the replacement of domestic rates by the community 
charge, the centralisation of non-domestic rates and the ultimate 
introduction of a national Uniform Business Rate (UBR) is based on 
economic and political arguments. 
Economically, it is argued that central government has a responsibility 
for controlling public expenditure, that public expenditure squeezes the 
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private sector and should therefore be reduced, that local government 
expenditure is a significant component of public expenditure, that local 
government expenditure is out of control and that central government, 
because of inherent defects in the rating system, is unable to bring local 
government expenditure under control. The economic theories which 
underlie these propositions are beyond the scope ofthis article. However, it 
is difficult to reconcile the assertion that local government expenditure is 
out of control with the evidence that local authority expenditure in the UK 
has fallen from 28% of public expenditure in 1979/80 to 25% in 1985/86. At 
the time the Green paper was published, planned expenditure by Scottish 
local authorities was only 3.2% above Government guidelines, which 
hardly seems likely to rock the macroeconomic boat. The power of central 
government to control local authority expenditure was formidable before 
1979, but since then successive Acts of Parliament first applying to Scotland 
and then, in a different form, to England and Wales, have given the 
Secretary of State unprecedented powers to control the general level of 
spending, and the spending and rating decisions of individual local 
authorities. 
It is at this point that we move from the economic to the political 
arguments, for the Green Paper concedes that the government has been 
successful in restraining local authority expenditure, but complains that 
central/local relationships have worsened and that local authorities have 
not been willing partners. The argument, implicit in the Green Paper, but 
made explicit in the House of Commons, then proceeds to assert that local 
electorates continue to elect recalcitrant local authorities and goes on to ask 
why this should be so. 
Here we come to the key political argument of the Green Paper -
accountability. Local authorities are not accountable to their domestic and 
non-domestic ratepayers who, together with central government, finance 
their spending policies. They are accountable to an electorate, the majority 
of whom do not pay rates. As a result, claims the Green Paper, "Many 
electors are indifferent to how much their local council sroends or are 
encouraged to vote for ever higher expenditure on services."( O) The results 
are unfair to domestic ratepayers and damaging to the competitive position 
of non-domestic ratepayers both within the UK and in an international 
context. Let us examine the evidence. 
Out of the Scottish electorate of 3.9 million, 1.9 million adults are 
householders liable to pay rates. Of that 1.9 million, 1.1 million pay full 
rates, 400,000 pay no rates at all and a further 400,000 receive a partial 
rebate. However, the simple assertion that only 1.1 million out of 3.9 
million adults pay full rates fails to reflect the fact that 1.3 million of the 2 
million non-householders are spouses of ratepayers and most organise their 
finances jointly. In the real world you don't have to be the householder in 
order to pay a share of the rates. 
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Furthermore, amongst the volumes of research on voting patterns, 
there is no evidence to support the proposition that electors vote for high 
spending policies because they will not have to finance them. Indeed, there 
is some evidence to the contrary, in that those least likely to pay rates and 
therefore with most to gain from high spending policies (young adults) are 
also less likely to vote than older people and less likely to vote in local rather 
than national elections. 
The alleged unfairness experienced by domestic ratepayers has in the 
past been argued on the basis that rates are not related to ability to pay (ie: 
that rates are a regressive form oftaxation). This is certainly true, although 
rates, it can be argued, are a tax on property, which while not necessarily 
relative to ability to pay do at least reflect a choice about household 
expenditure. 
However, clearly it would be ridiculous to criticise domestic rates on 
the ability-to-pay argument when the proposed alternative is a poll tax 
which bears absolutely no relationship to ability to pay. In fact, the 
argument has now shifted. It is now argued that the balance of local 
authority services has historically swung from property services (water, gas, 
electricity and protective services) to personal services (education, social 
services, libraries). It is therefore consistent to argue that the tax base 
should shift from a property tax to a personal (or poll) tax. The use of the 
term "community charge" to describe what is undoubtedly a head tax or 
poll tax is partly a cosmetic exercise but also reflects government 
philosophy. "Moving from rates to a flat-rate community charge would 
mark a major change in the direction of local government finance back to 
the option of charging for local authority services. "< 11 l 
No convincing case has been made to establish that non-domestic rates 
affect the competitive position of firms either within the UK or in an 
international context. The Green Paper concedes that "Hard evidence of 
the effects of rates on business is scarce" and that "How far business rate 
increases do affect the location and viability of businesses in particular 
areas must therefore still to a large degree be a matter of conjecture. "(12) 
Nevertheless, on the basis of this shaky evidence, the 1987 Act 
removes non-domestic rates from the control of Scottish local authorities 
with effect from April 1989. The maximum non-domestic rate for each 
authority will be determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with 
movements in the Retail Price Index (RPI). When revaluation practices in 
Scotland, England and Wales have been standardised, the government 
proposes to introduce a Uniform Business Rate (UBR) throughout Great 
Britain. The proceeds would be distributed to authorities on a per capita 
basis although safety nets would be required initially in view of the dramatic 
gains and losses which individual authorities would otherwise incur. 
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The final argument advanced for reform is that the 1985 revaluation in 
Scotland has caused "widespread Joss of public confidence in the present 
Scottish rating system and a vociferous demand for reform. "<12l No 
evidence is produced to indicate how widespread the loss of confidence or 
the demand for reform is. 
The Green Paper is, by consensus, poorly researched and argued. Its 
conclusions represent a complete reversal of the conclusions of the Layfield 
Committee and of the government's own 1983 White Paper, which found 
that the rating system was effective and that there were no reasonable 
alternatives to it. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Green 
Paper's proposals are based on short-term electoral expediency and a 
longer-term aim of further eroding the revenue-raising powers of local 
authorities. 
The Act and Conservative Policy 
If electoral expedience was, at least in part, behind the Act's 
proposals, the 1987 election results in Scotland must have disappointed its 
architects. 
However, it is important to note that the 1987 Act complements and 
promotes the government philosophy which has been current since 1979. 
This applies particularly in relation to fiscal policy, local government policy 
and policy towards Scotland. 
The government's preference has been to make the taxation system as 
a whole more regressive. The replacement of domestic rates with a system 
of community charges furthers this objective. The poll tax is more 
regressive than the rating system which, while not directly rated to ability to 
pay, at least bears some relationship to income and wealth since households 
living in the most expensive and desirable housing pay the highest rates. 
Everyone, irrespective of housing, income and wealth pays the same poll 
tax. 
A string of Acts of Parliament since 1979 have brought unprecedented 
central government control of local authority rating and spending decisions 
in Scotland, England and Wales. The 1987 Act will further tilt the central/ 
local relationship towards central control. By taking control of non-
domestic rates, central government will have control of 80% of Scottish 
local authority income (compared with 56% at present) thus increasing the 
already powerful leverage which it can apply. Furthermore, the Act 
empowers the Secretary of State to reduce the level of community charge of 
any authority whose expenditure is judged to be "excessive and 
unreasonable" by Parliament. 
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Scotland has been used as a test-bed for government legislation 
throughout the first two Thatcher governments, most notably in the field of 
rate-capping. The poll tax continues that trend. The rationale has been 
most eloquently, and offensively, explained by Sir George Young, MP for 
Ealing Acton and former Under-Secretary at the Department of the 
Environment: 
"While my own rates- at one point in the debate- would have gone 
down from over £2,000 to around £400, many voters in marginal seats 
would inevitably have to pay more ..... So, I, for one, am glad that the 
Scots are taking the shine of the new ball before the English go in to 
bat. "(13) 
Opposition Campaign 
The poll tax has found few supporters in Scotland. All the political 
parties, except the Conservatives declared their opposition as did 63 out of 
65 Scottish local authorities, the STUC, and a range of community and 
voluntary organisations. 
Most public criticism ofthe Green Paper and the 1987 Act has focused 
on the "winners and losers" and the redistributive and regressive nature of 
the poll tax. There has also been some discussion of the practical difficulties 
associated with levying and collecting the tax. In addition, attention has 
been focused on the effects on the central/local relationship, the democratic 
implications, civil liberties and the Scottish dimension. 
The community charge is a poll tax (or head tax) because, with a few 
specified exemptions, it is a flat rate tax levied on all adults over the age of 
18. Terminology was the first battleground. The fact that the tax is 
popularly referred to as a poll tax (the derogatory term favoured by its 
opponents) rather than a community charge (as its supporters would 
prefer) is an indication of how the battle has gone. 
Research has confirmed the commonsense proposition that the 
"winners" are most likely to be single adult households and households 
living in property with a high rateable value and that the "losers" are most 
likely to be households with three or more adults and households living in 
property with a low rateable value. 
Only prisoners, long-term hospital patients, the severely mentally 
handicapped and people living in residential and nursing homes will be 
exempt. The severely physically disabled will be eligible for 100% rebates. 
Everyone else will be required to contribute at least 20% of their poll tax. 
Shortly before the 1987 election, the government announced that income 
support claimants will have their benefits uprated to allow them to pay their 
rates or poll tax. 
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In general terms, the redistributive consequences within local 
authority areas are obvious and intended, and are in line with the 
government's fiscal policy. Shifts in the burden of paying for Regional 
Council services will also cause a significant transfer of tax burdens between 
local authority areas. The areas to benefit will be those with relatively high 
domestic rateable values. For example, within Strathclyde Region, areas 
like Eastwood and Bearsden and Milngavie will gain at the expense of areas 
like Glasgow, Cumnock and Doon Valley and Clydebank. There will be 
further transfers between local authority areas when the Uniform Business 
Rate and the "pooling" system are eventually introduced. 
The Act has come under fire from professional associations largely on 
the grounds of practicality and the cost implications. The decision to bring 
in the poll tax in one "big bang" in 1989, rather than phase it in over 3 years, 
will ease the administrative problems, but it will certainly not remove them. 
The costs of implementing the Act and the likely collection levels are 
matters of fierce dispute and will not be finally resolved until after the 
event, but a number of serious practical difficulties do exist and will have to 
be tackled. 
Research commissioned by COSLA and the Scottish Consumer 
Council has identified the scale of some of the problems: 
Amongst a representative sample of 18-24 year old Scots, there was 
found to be a high degree of mobility- 34% had 3 or more addresses 
since the age of 18- and a reluctance to register to vote- 32% said 
they were not registered. These factors clearly pose problems for the 
compilation of the community charges register. 
People on maximum rebates could be due to pay £50 - £60 a year. 
Experience of companies collecting from this type of consumer and 
expressed preferences indicate that the most effective forms of 
collection (such as a weekly visit) are likely to be the most expensive 
to staff and administer. Collection with rents may reduce the scale of 
the problem, but will undermine the stated objectives of 
perceptibility and accountability. 
Widespread default is likely. A significant number of 18-24 year olds 
indicated that they had no goods worth poinding (the legal term for 
impounding) and sheriff officers were concerned about the legal 
complications of poindings against non-householders. The most 
effective means of recovering arrears- a speedy and personal visit to 
the client -was also likely to be the most costly. 
For the first time in British history, there is now a direct financial 
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incentive for citizens to keep their names off the Electoral Register. While 
the Community Charges Register will be kept separate from the Electoral 
Register, cross-checks between the two will be made and many young 
people in particular will be tempted to avoid liability for taxation by giving 
up their right to vote. 
Compilation of the Community Charges Register will require 
canvassers to ask intrusive personal questions in order to compile the 
Register and to provide local authorities with the information necessary to 
levy the tax. 
Registration, levying and collection will all be more expensive than 
current systems because of the requirement to keep the Community 
Charges Register up to date on a day to day basis and because many more 
demands and payments will require to be processed. 
The administration costs and loss of revenue are the subject of some 
controversy but finance officers have estimated that collection levels could 
be as low as 80% due to the practical dificulties in registration, collection 
and enforcement. This compares with a collection level of around 99% for 
domestic rates. Any shortfall will be reflected in the level of community 
charge. An 80% collection rate would mean a 25% "surcharge" for those 
actually paying the tax. Government figures on "winners and losers" have 
to date been based on the untenable assumption that there will be a 100% 
collection rate. 
If the poll tax is in accordance with the government's general fiscal 
policies, it is certainly true that the centralisation of control over non-
domestic rates is a logical extension of the government's centralising 
policies. 
The government will take control of non-domestic rates, leaving local 
authorities with control over less than 20% of their income. The result is 
that very minor reductions in revenue support grant, even a failure to allow 
for a realistic rate of inflation, will have a multiplier effect on the level of 
community charge. This is because the entire shortfall has to be made up by 
what was previously the domestic ratepaying sector, without any 
contribution from business ratepayers. The example below shows that, 
Council Expenditure 
Government Grant 
Business Rate Income 
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with inflation running at 5%, a standstill Council budget in real terms, and a 
5% cut in government grant, the net result is a 55% increase in the personal 
community charge. 
A decision to increase council spending has a similar multiplier effect on 
community charge levels. 
Central government will have even more power to influence local 
spending policies, but the act still reserves the government's right to reduce 
community charge levels if an authority's spending is judged "excessive and 
unreasonable" by Parliament. 
An opinion poll commissioned by the Scottish Local Government 
Information Unit in November 1986 found that 80% of Scots were opposed 
to the introduction ofthe poll tax in Scotland ahead of England and Wales. 
Of course, this is not the first time that Scotland has been used as a test-
bed for local government legislation. Ratecapping, in particular, was tried 
out in the early 1980s in Scotland. The justification advanced by the 
government on this occasion relates to the 1985 revaluation and the effect 
this had on the credibility of the existing rating system. 
The opposition campaign did not achieve the always improbable 
objective of keeping the Bill off the statute book but it can be judged to 
have been successful to the extent that public opinion swung against the poll 
tax and it certainly had a number of interesting features. 
COSLA (the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities) took the 
unprecedented step of establishing a "Bill team" to follow the Bill through 
Parliament and to brief politicians, press and others on the details of the 
legislation. COSLA's member authorities provided experts on local 
authority law, finance, electoral registration, rating, welfare rights, 
housing benefits and public relations, who met on a regular basis to provide 
information on and analysis of the Bill. COSLA's activities reflected both 
the significance of the Bill for the future of Scottish local government and 
the changing role of COSLA itself. As co-operation and consensus between 
local and central government have broken down, COSLA's traditional role 
as a mediator and sounding board has become less important, and it has 
increasingly become a forceful advocate and publicist of local government 
interests. 
The Scottish media have, for the most part, been hostile to the terms of 
the Act, particularly the poll tax. This brought complaints from defeated 
Conservative candidates in the 1987 election that the community charge 
had had a bad press and that the Scottish press was, unlike Fleet Street, 
anti-Conservative. 
The Committee debates in the House of Commons were generally 
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judged to have been of poor quality. The government side was content to 
use its majority to vote the Bill through without entering into serious debate 
while the opposition failed to exploit the political capital presented by the 
Bill or its technical weaknesses. Most political commentators judged that 
Lord Ross's contributions in the House of Lords were far more pointed and 
effective than anything heard in the Commons. 
Perhaps the most effective opposition was carried out by the officers 
and members of the Scottish local authorities themselves. 
Senior local government officers, normally reluctant to comment on 
matters of political controversy, attacked the reforms on technical grounds, 
while local government politicians lost no time in exposing the regressive 
aspect of the tax. 
The Future for Local Government Finance 
Local government has been bedevilled by committees of inquiry and 
reorganisations whicp have been concerned with structure or finance but 
have ignored the links between the two. In reality, decisions about 
structure have implications for the mechanisms used for finance and vice 
versa. 
Because of the practical difficulties and the "gearing" mechanism 
referred to earlier, it is difficult to see how the 1987 Act provides a long 
term basis for financing the present structure of Scottish local government. 
In view of the present government's centralist tendencies, the next step 
could be 100% central fu ding with local authorities left to administer a 
centrally determined block grant. If this scenario seems far-fetched, 
remember that the effect of the 1987 Act will be to reduce local authority 
control over income in Scotland from 44% to less than 20%. 
Alternatively, the provisions of the 1987 Act might be more practical if 
local government was stripped of major functions. In view of the current 
proposals for privatisation of key services and the downgrading of local 
authorities as providers of education and housing, this scenario, too, may 
not be wholly unrealistic. 
The opponents of the 1987 Act favour either a reformed rating system 
or local income tax. While they disagree over an alternative to the rates, 
they are united in their support for a Scottish Assembly which would 
presumably, if they were successful, have the final say. 
The 1987 Act does not provide the basis for effective, democratic local 
government. It is not just the inequity of the poll tax which is the problem. 
The massive tilt towards the centre in the central/local financial relationship 
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has a similar effect on the central/local political relationship. 
In any future reforms, local government structure and finance should 
be looked at together, not in isolation, with the objective of defining a 
method of financing local government appropriate to a pluralist political 
system in which local government has the power to formulate, finance and 
implement policy within appropriate areas, subject only to the approval of 
its own electorate. 
Archie Fairley, Director, Scottish Local Government Information Unit. 
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